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NOTE
LOW-INCOME HOUSING AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
The acute shortage of suitable housing for low-income and minor-
ity groups is one of America's most intractable and fundamental
domestic problems. One in eight American families is housed in dwel-
ling units considered to be substandard." Exclusionary zoning and
building codes effectively fence the poor out of affluent communities; 2
the growth of public housing programs has been sporadic and inade-
quate.3 In many jurisdictions, the development of equal housing
opportunities has been further impeded by the additional burden of
a public referendum.4
In a number of recent cases, disadvantaged groups have attempted
to overturn laws that have been used to block the construction of
low-income housing, arguing that the denial of equal access to housing
opportunities to minority groups and the poor constitutes a denial of
equal protection.5 The right to equal housing opportunities can be
interpreted in two different ways: it can mean either a right not to be
excluded from areas in which low-income housing units can be built
or a right to have such units built. Thus, it can form the basis of
challenges both to exclusionary zoning practices and to laws that
1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, BACKGROUND PAPERS 338
(1970). "Substandard" housing is defined to include both units that are dilapidated and
those that are not dilapidated but lack separate sanitary fadlities; there are 8 million
substandard housing units in the United States. I REPORT OF THE PRESIENT'S COMM. ON
URBAN HOUSING, TECHNICAL STUDIES 9 (1967).
2 Dietsch, Cracking the Suburbs, THE NEv REPUBLIC, Sept. 5, 1970, at 8; Graham,
Court Tests of Zoning Against the Poor, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1970, § 4 (News of the
Week in Review), at 11, col. 5.
To date, housing programs serving low-income groups have been concen-
trated in the ghettos. Nonghetto areas, particularly suburbs, for the most part
have steadfastly opposed low-income, rent supplement, or below-market interest
rate housing, and have successfully restricted use of these programs outside the
ghetto.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisoRY Colvmm'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 263 (1968). See generally
Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for
Home Rule?, 1 ToLEmo L. RIv. 65 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
3 L. FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF PovERTY 15 (1969). For a detailed
discussion of the exceptional vulnerability of public housing programs to frustration by
legislative action and inaction ("legislative harassment') on both the federal and local
levels, see id. at 4-55.
4 Id. at 5, 45, 47-48; see note 110 and accompanying text infra.
5 See notes 49-56, 107-12 and accompanying text infra.
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restrict public housing development. The resolution of these challenges
will depend largely on the standard of review applied by the courts.
I
THE STANDARD OF RE IEw
A. The Sliding Scale
The standard of review in equal protection cases depends upon
both the nature of the classification and the importance of the interest
affected. In most situations, equal protection requires only that the
legislation bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental
objective.6 Where a classification is based upon a "suspect" trait or
where fundamental interests are affected, however, the legislation is
subjected to a stricter standard of review, to a more "rigid scrutiny." 7
In these cases, an overriding social justification must be established
before equal protection requirements are satisfied.8
Classifications based upon race are unquestionably suspect and,
at least where unbenign,9 are subject to rigid scrutiny.10 Although a
6 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 810 U.S. 141
(1940); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv. 341,
844 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Hagv. L. REV. 1065, 1087
(1969).
• Loving v. Virginia, 888 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 828 US. 214,
216 (1944); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 6, at 856; Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, supra note 6, at 1088.
8 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194
(1964). Under this test, the burden is on the state to establish that the public interest
involved outweighs the disadvantages imposed on the affected groups. Chambers v.
Hendersonville City Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966); Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process For-
mula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 716, 734 (1969).
9 Racial classifications may be used to achieve equality by giving preferential treat-
ment to groups that have suffered discrimination in the past. Where racial classifications
are employed to promote rather than to deny equality, they may be characterized as
"benign." See generally Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule
in Shelley's Case," 17 RuTGrEs L. Ray. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv.
363 (1966); Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of
the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 84 (1970); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing
Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960).
10 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Thus, racially exclusionary zoning provisions have been struck down as violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 US. 60 (1917). (The case was decided
before the expansion of equal protection and rested on a due process theory. Id. at 82.
More recent decisions (e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)), indicate that such
measures are also violative of equal protection.)
LOW-INCOME HO USING
suspect classification alone is enough to activate the strict standard of
review, a classification that is only "traditionally disfavored," such as
wealth,"1 is not. 2 When a disfavored classification infringes upon a
fundamental interest, however, the strict standard of review is elicited.
For example, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,3 the Supreme
Court held that a poll tax of $1.50 violated the equal protection clause
because the affluence of the voter was an unconstitutional condition
to the exercise of the franchise, a fundamental interest.'4
By itself, infringement of an interest may be insufficient to elicit
"rigid scrutiny"; if that is the case, the concurrence of both a funda-
mental interest and a disfavored classification is necessary. Thus, denial
of the right to vote to felons and to the insane' 5 and to those who fall
literacy tests'8 does not violate equal protection. And in McDonald v.
Board of Election,17 the Court's conclusion that Illinois's failure to
provide absentee ballots for unsentenced inmates awaiting trial did not
violate equal protection was based upon a less exacting scrutiny be-
cause there was no classification on the basis of wealth.'8
11 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
12 For example, racial segregation of public amphitheaters (Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated mem., 347 U.S. 971 (1954)), public
beaches and bathhouses (Dawson v. Mayor & City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd
mem., 350 U.S. 877 (1955)), and public motor buses (Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956)) has been held to be an invidious discrimina-
tion. It is highly unlikely, however, that the requirement of a fee from persons desiring
to use these facilities would elicit "rigid scrutiny," even though the poor might thereby
be disqualified from their use. The reason is that the use of such public facilities is not
a sufficiently fundamental interest to activate the strict standard of review when a non-
suspect classification is involved. The more restrained standard of review is therefore
appropriate, and, since the imposition of such fees bears a reasonable relation to the
legitimate purpose of raising money to maintain these facilities, there would be no
violation of equal protection.
Is 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14 Id. at 667. The Court's reasoning, that "[v]oter qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax" (id. at 666), was ostensibly
based upon the restrained standard of review. Yet, as Justice Black pointed out in his
dissenting opinion, the fee requirement did have a reasonable relation both to the collec-
tion of state revenue and to the state's belief that voters who pay a tax will be more
interested in furthering the state's welfare than those who do not. Id. at 674. In reality,
then, the Court used a strict rather than a restrained standard of review. See Sager, supra
note 2, at 778-79.
15 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 673 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
16 Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
17 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Is Id. at 807. Alternatively, the Court believed that the Illinois scheme had no impact
on the inmates' ability to exercise their right to vote because it was not the right to vote
itself but the right to absentee ballots that was denied. This position seems to ignore the
reality of the situation; where inmates are unable to leave prison to go to the polls, the
denial of absentee ballots has an obviously adverse impact on their ability to vote.
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The equal protection decisions evince a sliding scale approach to
the determination of the invidiousness of a particular discrimination. 19
The more suspect the classification or the more fundamental the
interest, the more likely it is that an invidious discrimination will be
found. Conversely, the less suspect the classification or the less impor-
tant the interest, the less likely it is that the court will find an invidious
discrimination. The remaining issues, then, are the constitutional status
of the wealth classification and the constitutional importance of equal
access to housing.
B. Wealth as a Disfavored Classification and Housing as a Funda-
mental Interest
In McDonald, the Supreme Court observed that lines drawn on
the basis of wealth "would independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." 20
Although not on a par with classifications based upon race,21 classifica-
tions based upon wealth or property are "traditionally disfavored." 22
In combination with wealth classifications, the courts have char-
acterized voting,23 equal access to the criminal process,24 procreation, 25
and the right to interstate travel26 as fundamental interests. In suspect
classification cases, the courts have indicated that, apart from the nature
Voting has recently been treated by the Supreme Court as an interest sufficiently im-
portant to independently activate the strict standard of review. Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 895 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Both
cases, however, to a certain extent involved classifications based upon property.
19 Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, Foreword
to The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAIv. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966); Karst, supra note 8, at
789-40, 744; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 1120-21. See
also Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANs. Q. 1 (1965).
20 894 U.S. at 807.
21 Some commentators predict that "distinctions based on wealth-at least those that
run against the poor-will no doubt be assimilated to the race cases." Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. R v. 89,
75. But see Sager, supra note 2, at 785-87.
22 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 583 U.S. 668 (1966).
23 Id.
24 Anders v. California, 886 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 853
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
25 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 816 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the
Supreme Court struck down a law requiring sterilization for certain criminal offenders.
Although Skinner stressed the importance of the procreation interest, the classification
based upon wealth (white-collar crimes were exempted) may also explain the decision.
See Karst, supra note 8, at 733-34.
26 Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618 (1969).
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of the classification, voting,27 the right to earn a living,23 housing,29
marriage, 30 and education 3' are fundamental interests.
To determine the constitutional status of housing as a fundamental
interest, the courts may seek guidance in the history and background
of the Constitution and in prior Supreme Court decisions.32 The
policies expressed in federal legislation and the social milieu are also
important considerations:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory,
we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of
what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental
rights.... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change.3
The crucial importance of housing has been recognized in federal
legislation 4 and executive studies.35 The Supreme Court has proclaimed
27 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi, 880
U.S. 128 (1965).
28 It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
to secure.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948).
29 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948).
80 Loving v. Virginia, 888 U.. 1 (1967).
31 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 483
(1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
32 Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 435, 439 (1967).
3 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
84 The Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), declared as a national objective
"the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family. .. ." Accord, Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-37 (Supp. V, 1970). On September 23, 1970, the Senate
approved a comprehensive $4 billion housing bill, some provisions of which are designed
to deal with the problem of urban concentration. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. V, 1970), seeks to increase
housing opportunities by making discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of
housing illegal.
35 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 1, at 337-49;
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COlMM'N ON CIVIL DssoRBEs 257, 260 (1968); REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 1, at 27.
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that "[h]ousing is a necessary of life."36 The rationale of the reappor-
tionment cases, -that the franchise is "preservative of other basic civil
and political rights,"3 7 has a counterpart in the housing area:
Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded... as
an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil
rights and liberties which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was in-
tended to guarantee.38
In Brown v. Board of Education,"9 the Supreme Court's assessment
of the importance of education40 was based largely on the relationship
between education and the achievement of other fundamental objec-
tives. 41 Similarly, equal access to housing opportunities plays a vital
role in securing other fundamental interests; increasingly, jobs and
educational opportunities are moving away from the cities, where dis-
advantaged groups are largely concentrated, to the suburbs.42 Thus,
to block the poor from access to more affluent communities is to deny
them an equal chance to earn a living and acquire a decent education.43
Housing is, therefore, a fundamental interest. Even if the housing
interest is not sufficiently important to independently elicit rigid scru-
tiny, the combination of this interest and the wealth classification should
be found to constitute an invidious discrimination that will activate the
overriding justification test.
36 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 185, 156 (1921). Other cases in which the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of housing include Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 885 (1969);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 887 U.S. 869 (1967);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 34 US. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
87 Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
8 Shelley v. Kraemer, 834 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
39 847 U.S. 483 (1954).
40 "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments." Id. at 493.
41 Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
Id.
42 M. HARmNGION, TE AcCIDENTAL CENTURY 287-88 (1965); RrORT OF TH NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DisoRDERs 260 (1968); Herbers, Aide Quits H.U.D. and Calls It
Biased, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1970, at 17, col. 4; Sanders, James Haughton Wants 500,000
More jobs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 80, 126.
[The isolation of the poor in the slums] has corrupted the quality of life of the
entire society. It accounts for the class and racial segregation in the American
.educational system and the principle that those who most need training shall
have the least chance to get it. It has been a factor in the institutionalization of
racism and in the promotion of riots.
M. HAmRNGTON, supra at 288.
43 There are additional adverse effects of residential isolation:
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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Zoning laws44 that discriminate against minorities5 and the poor 6
severely handicap these groups in their efforts to obtain decent housing.
Under the strict standard of review, such restrictions should be in-
validated, absent conditions of long-term emergency 47 The courts seem
One predicate for the proposition that separate treatment is inherently unequal
is the vulnerability of a traditionally disadvantaged group to discrimination
once its members are separated from the protective company of those who com-
mand governmental respect. This is certainly applicable to residential drcum-
stance. Residents of ghettos are highly vulnerable to second-rate municipal
services of all sorts, to disadvantage in the process of education, to functional
emasculation of their franchise through gerrymandering, to selective and adverse
police practices, and to the abusive tactics of private merchants.
Sager, supra note 2, at 782.
For a discussion of the social and economic consequences of residential segregation,
see CoMIsSION ON RACE & HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LrvE? 85-42 (1958).
44 The zoning laws challenged in the cases herein discussed involve land-use classi-
fications. Other types of zoning laws can, of course, result in racial or economic dis-
crimination; for example, laws requiring that no house cost less than a certain amount,
laws setting minimum floor space or acreage standards, and laws providing for the
separation of districts for different types of housing. See generally Aloi, Goldberg & White,
supra note 2, at 75-80; Sager, supra note 2, at 798-98. A separate discussion of these laws
is unnecessary since the same considerations that determine the constitutionality of land-
use classifications apply to these types of zoning laws as well.
45 Zoning has long been used to contain racial groups inside the ghetto. G. MYRDAL,
AN AM-muCAN DILEMMA 600-01, 628-24 (1944); J. VANDER ZANDEN, AMESuCAN MINoarrY
RELATIONS 216 (1963); Abrams, The Housing Problem and the Negro, in THE NEGRO
AMmucAN 512 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1965).
When the courts held racial covenants unenforceable, subtler devices were
ushered in, including overrigid zoning ordinances sternly enforced against Negroes
but relaxed for whites. Condeinnation for incinerator dumps or other public
works is another current device, while building inspectors and other petty offi-
cials are always on hand to harass the Negro who ventures where he is not
wanted. When, for example, a private builder announced he would sell a few of
his houses to Negroes in Deerfield, Illinois, his site was promptly condemned for
a park. When the Ford Motor Company moved its plant from Richmond, Cali-
fornia, to Milpitas, and when the union tried to build houses for its Negro
workers, the area was promptly rezoned for industrial use. Thereafter came a
sudden strengthening of building regulations, followed by a hike of sewer con-
nection costs to a ransom figure.
Id. at 516.
The courts are beginning to invalidate such exclusionary tactics. In Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y. 1970), the city's refusal
to permit a black low-cost housing project to hook upto the city sewer system was held to
violate the equal protection clause.
46 See note 2 and accompanying text supra. In Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Org. v. Union City (SASSO), 424 F2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), although plaintiffs alleged
racial motivation, the court rejected this claim and characterized the issue in terms of
,discriminatory effect on "low-income residents of Union City." Id. at 295.
47 Laws that expressly exclude minority groups have been upheld only in times of na-
tional crisis, where wartime emergency was the crucial factor. Korematsu v. United States,
1971]
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to disagree, however, about what plaintiffs must prove to establish
invidious discrimination.48
A. Proof of Invidious Discrimination
In Dailey v. City of Lawton,49 the Tenth Circuit held that the
refusal of the planning commission and the city council to grant
rezoning essential for construction of a privately sponsored low-income
housing project was racially motivated50 and therefore constituted arbi-
trary and unreasonable action in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.51 The opinion's findings and reasoning
would similarly support a holding of a violation of the equal protection
clause.52 In Ranjel v. City of Lansing,3 the district court held that a
323 U.S. 214 (1944). Moreover, the exclusion of Japanese and Japanese-Americans from cer-
tain areas of the West Coast was viewed as a temporary measure. Id. at 219-20. See also
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917), the preservation of the public peace and welfare was held insufficient to validate
such an exclusion.
48 Some commentators view the state action requirement as an obstacle to applying
the equal protection clause to the problem of housing opportunities. See Aloi, Goldberg &
White, supra note 2, at 96-102. They suggest that the obstacle can be overcome either on
the theory that urban housing is a public function (Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
385-86 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)), or on the ground of significant state involvement
through government financing of housing developments. Id. Although these arguments
have merit, they are unnecessary. Zoning laws are promulgated by local governmental
bodies whose actions are subject to the fourteenth amendment. Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). For discussions of the decreasing vitality of the concept
of state action in the housing area, see Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and Cali-
fornia's Proposition 14, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69
(1967); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(1962); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 347 (1963).
49 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
50 Id. at 1039-40. The court may have found it unnecessary to examine the dis-
criminatory effect, since evidence of motive revealed that the sole purpose of the city's
action was to discriminate; this of course is not a legitimate governmental objective. See
notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.
51 425 F.2d at 1040.
52 The Dailey court reasoned that the city's action was unfair and constituted an
unreasonable zoning classification for the property. Id. Equal protection also requires a
reasonable relation between the classification and the purpose of the law. See note 6 and
accompanying text supra. Thus, even under the restrained standard of review, such an
arbitrary classification would violate the equal protection clause as well as the due
process clause.
Although an arbitrary classification may violate both due process and equal protec-
tion, the tests for both are not identical. Thus, in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), the court rejected plaintiffs' due process
argument on the ground that, since social and environmental values could support the
zoning determination, the result could not be said to be arbitrary. Id. at 294. Neverthe-
less, if the effect were discriminatory, there might still be a violation of plaintiffs' equal
protection rights. Id. at 295.
53 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 980 (1970).
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proposed referendum on an ordinance rezoning a twenty-acre site in a
white neighborhood from a one-family residential to a community plan
was motivated by racial factors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that the evidence was insufficient to establish discriminatory motiva-
tion. 4 In Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union
City (SASSO), 55 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the repeal by referendum
of a similar ordinance that rezoned a tract to allow construction of a
housing project for low- and middle-income families, reaching a different
result. The court held that if, apart from voter motive, the effect of the
referendum was discriminatory, then "a substantial constitutional ques-
tion is presented." 56
1. What Must Be Proved
There are situations where the terms of a statute or its practical
effect point to only one conceivable purpose: discrimination. This was
so, for example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot57 and Reitman v. Mulkey.58
In such cases, the measure may be held unconstitutional because its
sole purpose is illegitimate. 9 The more difficult question arises if no
such discriminatory motive can be shown.
Although some earlier cases required intentional or purposeful
discrimination, 0 more recent equal protection decisions tend to empha-
54 417 F.2d at 323-24. The Sixth Circuit's decision seems questionable on several
grounds. First, the court failed to consider the background and social milieu. See notes
74-83 and accompanying text infra. Second, the court did not examine the effect of the
referendum, as required by Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See notes 89-93 and
accompanying text infra. Finally, the court's intimation that a referendum can never
violate the fourteenth amendment is incorrect. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text
infra.
The court did not discuss the effect of the referendum, but the reversal can be par-
tially explained on this basis. Although repeal of the ordinance would have blocked
construction of a five-story apartment for the elderly, 100 houses planned for poor black
and Mexican-American families could still be built under the prior ordinance. 417 F.2d
at 324.
55 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
56 Id. at 295.
57 364 U.S. 339 (1960). There, the apparent neutrality of a law redistricting the city
of Tuskegee did not shield it from a finding of unconstitutionality when "for all practical
purposes ... the legislation [was] solely concerned with segregati[on] .... " Id. at 341.
58 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Ninth Circuit in SASSO said of Reitman:
The only existing restrictions on dealings in land (and thus the obvious target of
the amendment) were those prohibiting private discrimination. The only "con-
ceivable" purpose, judged by wholly objective standards, was to restore the right
to discriminate and protect it against future legislative limitation.
424 F.2d at 295.
59 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 1091.
60 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); MacKay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock,
250 U.S. 94, 100 (1919); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350,
353 (1918).
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size the discriminatory effect of the law. Thus, the landmark cases of
Griffin v. Illinois,61 Harper v. Virginia Board' of Elections, 2 and
Hunter v. Erickson6 were decided on the basis of effect, without ref-
erence to the issue of discriminatory motive.
This is clearly the more justifiable view. First, the determination
of a discriminatory legislative motive would impugn the integrity of a
coordinate branch of government,. and the courts have understandably
shied away from such judgments.65 The referendum situation involves
still further difficulties; as the Ninth Circuit noted in SASSO, "a prob-
ing of the private attitudes of the voters.., would entail an intolerable
invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise of the franchise." 66
Second, such a determination may be practically impossible. The
motives of individual legislators or voters may well conflict; moreover,
it is extremely unlikely that many defendants will be willing to parade
their prejudices openly.67 Third, in view of the refined discriminatory
devices that have been used in the past, s it is clear that to require
61 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that all indigent defendants be furnished with a
free transcript).
62 883 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating a $1.50 poll tax).
63 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating a measure prohibiting open housing legislation
without voter approval). Purposeful discrimination was also unnecessary in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating residence requirements for welfare recipi-
ents); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 788 (1967) (requiring appointed counsel to file a
brief before he may withdraw from case); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(requiring that indigent defendants have appointed counsel on appeal).
04 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810).
65 See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
66 424 F.2d at 295.
6T The district court in Dailey explicitly recognized this difficulty. Because of its
realization that most persons will not publicly admit their prejudices, the absence of
both discussion of race at the public meetings and statements by city officials demon-
strating an intent to discriminate was not deemed crucial. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296
F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
Although improbable, public admissions by defendants are not impossible. See, e.g.,
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), where de-
fendants' corroborating testimony regarding discriminatory intent in public housing site
selection facilitated the court's finding of a denial of equal protection.
68 The courts have struck down laws designed to minimize the black vote by im-
posing stringent registration requirements (e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 880 U.S. 145
(1965); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872
(S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949)); laws designed to dilute the minority vote in
general elections by excluding such groups from voting in primaries (e.g., Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S, 649 (1944)); and laws designed to circum-
vent school desegregation requirements (e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968) (freedom-of-choice plan invalidated); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 389 US. 571 (1968) (state financial
assistance to students at private schools invalidated)).
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direct proof of improper motivation is to emasculate the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court has proclaimed, however, that "[t]he
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination."10 9 Finally, whether the damage inflicted is the main
purpose of a law or a subsidiary, even unintended, effect should make
no difference. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,70 the Su-
preme Court observed:
[N]o state may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either
ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the
motive may be. It is of no consolation to an individual denied the
equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith.71
There is some confusion as to whether this analysis changes in a
referendum situation. The SASSO decision implies that it does not.
In Raniel, the court of appeals disagreed: "Initiative and referendum
is an important part of the state's legislative process. Being founded on
neutral principles, it should be exempt from Federal Court con-
straints." 72 This dictum, however, is mistaken. The Supreme Court
made it clear in Reitman and Hunter that the referendum procedure
does not immunize an otherwise unconstitutional state action.73 If a poll
tax similar to that struck down in Harper were enacted by the voters
through initiative and referendum, it would remain unconstitutional.
The answer to the argument that because the referendum procedure is
neutral its results are irrevocable is that when its effect is neutral,
69 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
70 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71 Id. at 725 (emphasis added). In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), where defendant's failure to assure relocation for minority
groups to the same extent it did for whites was held to violate the equal protection clause,
the court observed:
"Equal protection of the laws" means more than merely the absence of govern-
mental action designed to discriminate; as Judge J. Skelly Wright has said, "we
now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as dis-
astrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a
willful scheme."
Id. at 931, quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Making motive rather than effect determinative may lead to strange results when the
motive is questionable but the effect is not discriminatory. See, e.g., the Stennis Amend-
ment, sponsored by Southern Senators who have not been known as champions of inte-
gration, which provided for equal application of federal school desegregation standards
in all parts of the country. 116 CONG. Ric. S 1444 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1970).
72 417 F.2d at 824 (dictum).
78 [i]nsisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it desires and that
the people may retain for themselves the power over certain subjects may gen-
erally be true, but these principles furnish no justification for a legislative struc-
ture which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hunter v. Erickson, 898 US. 885, 892 (1969).
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legislation by referendum is permissible, but when its impact is judi-
cially determined to be discriminatory, such legislation violates the
Constitution.
2. Facts Necessary for Proof
In Reitman, where the Supreme Court held that the repeal and
prohibition of further enactment of open housing legislation violated
the fourteenth amendment, great weight was placed on the "historical
context and the conditions existing prior to . . . enactment." 74 In
Dailey75 and in the lower court's opinion in Ranjel,76 the existing segre-
gated housing patterns were an important factor.7 7 The disadvantages
suffered by those isolated in ghettos78---substandard housing, a higher
incidence of death and disease, and a lower level of municipal services
to alleviate these conditions-may also be considered.79 Peculiarities in
74 387 U.S. at 373.
75 425 F.2d at 1039.
76 Although Lansing's population was only 10% black and Mexican-American, 65%
of these groups were concentrated in a ghetto. One large section of this ghetto was 91%
black. 293 F. Supp. at 303.
77 Similarly, in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. -
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), the court noted that the communities involved were historically racially
segregated. See note 83 infra.
The courts have long used statistical patterns to prove discrimination. For example,
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356 (1886), the Court found a violation of equal
protection where San Francisco's Board of Supervisors refused permission to operate a
laundry to 150 of the 240 Chinese laundry operators, but had not refused it to any of
the 80 non-Chinese operators.
More recently, in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill. 1969), the court found that the veto of over 99.5% of proposed housing sites located
in white neighborhoods and only 10% of sites located in black neighborhoods could be
plausibly explained only on the basis of racial discrimination. And in Hicks v. Weaver,
302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), the court held that the location of public housing in all-
black neighborhoods creates a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory site selection
which, if unexplained, establishes a violation of equal protection.
78 In Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y.
1970), the court noted that blacks were concentrated in a highly industrialized and
polluted area that had the lowest per capita income, the oldest and most deteriorated
housing, and the highest density per unit in the city.
79 Thus, in Ranjel, the district court considered one particular ghetto area that was
91% black: 75% of the dwellings were substandard or dilapidated; 1/3 of the units were
overcrowded; the infant mortality rates were 50% higher than in other parts of the
city; and the incidence of tuberculosis, heart disease, venereal disease, and chronic
arthritis was also higher there than elsewhere. 293 F. Supp. at 303.
The Sixth Circuit, while proclaiming sympathy, dismissed this evidence rather
summarily: "These conditions ... concerning the plight of the poor, were not peculiar to
Lansing nor indeed to the United States, but have existed for centuries in many places
throughout the world." 417 F.2d at 322. The same could have been said about racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing units in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
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the local scene are relevant. For example, in Dailey, although the
surrounding area was zoned R-4 for high density, the proposed building
site had been reclassified from R-4 to PF for public facilities. Officials
refused to change the site's designation back to R-4, even though it had
never been used or planfied for use as a public facility and was privately
owned.80 Such circumstances indicated a strong probability that social
and environmental land-use considerations were not paramount in the
city's zoning determination.81
The historical setting of the referendum is also important. Perhaps
the referendum has been consistently used to block low-income hous-
ing.8 2 Or perhaps, as in Ranjel, although the referendum procedure is
being used for the first time, numerous other community building plans
providing almost exclusively for people of middle and upper income
have not been subjected to a referendum. 3
The circumstances surrounding enactment may provide additional
evidence. Thus, a blatantly racist campaign effort provides strong evi-
dence of discrimination. 4 City planners and councilmen may testify
as to feedback from their constituents; the Tenth Circuit, in Dailey,
mentioned anonymous phone calls to the project's sponsors.85 Although
(1967), but this did not prevent the Supreme Court from holding that such discrimina-
tion was unconstitutional. The pervasiveness of a problem should not be an excuse for
inaction; it should rather be a strong incentive for alleviating the problem with what-
ever tools are at hand.
80 425 F.2d at 1038.
81 The court of appeals concluded that the city's action was arbitrary and unreason-
able. Id. at 1040.
82 See Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Cal.), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Shaffer v. Valtierra, 399 U.S. 925, and sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 398
US. 949 (1970).
83 293 F. Supp. at 304-05. In SASSO, too, the city had never before experienced
either an initiative or a referendum, despite "considerable recent residential growth and
development, with a substantial percentage of new housing starts involving multi-family
projects." Brief for Appellants at 33, Southern Alamedia Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
The situation in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. -
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), was similar, although a referendum was not involved. There, a New
York municipality had approved new subdivisions in predominantly white neighborhoods
despite its awareness of overloaded sewer conditions. In light of this background, the
city's subsequent refusal to permit a Negro housing corporation planning a low-cost
project to hook up to the city's sewers was held to violate the equal protection clause.
84 In Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 93 (1949), the court
considered the following campaign material evidence of discrimination: "WARNING IS
SOUNDED: BLACKS WILL TAKE OVER IF AMENDMENT LOSES." The court also
mentioned editorials in the local newspaper which characterized the amendment as "a
measure designed simply and solely to enable registrars legally to hold down the number
of Negro registrants." Id. at 880.
85 425 F.2d at 1039.
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the court of appeals in Ranjel held that discrimination may not be
established by such "opinion evidence,""6 it may still be helpful in
depicting the social milieu. In a referendum context, if the signers of
the petition were all whitesT or if the voting "broke down along...
racial lines,"88 such circumstances may also be considered.
The courts must next evaluate the potential impact or effect of
the measure in light of this background. 9 Where a particular project
has been blocked, courts should consider the availability of alternative
sites.90 Thus, an important factor in the district court's decision in
Ranjel was that "all possible sites could be eliminated, leaving the
displaced Black and Mexican minority groups with nowhere to go."0 1
86 417 F.2d at 323. The court of appeals objected to the strong weight given by the
lower court both to a city planner's testimony that race was an important factor in that
situation and to the testimony of a Dr. Goldner that, in general, race would be an
important factor in similar situations. The court failed to consider, however, the existing
patterns of segregation and the historical immunity of housing developments for middle-
and upper-income groups from the burden of a referendum.
87 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970). Such circumstances
may also be relevant in a nonreferendum context, where the action taken by the local
governing body is influenced by a petition. Thus, a petition opposing a black housing
project signed by residents of a predominantly white ward was a factor considered by the
court in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y.
1970).
88 Brief for Appellants at 33, Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). A study of voting patterns in the California fair
housing referendum (struck down in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)) indicated
varying degrees of racial prejudice. Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing
in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 753, 765-67
(1968).
The voting pattern may also, of course, indicate the absence of discrimination. On
remand, the district court in SASSO noted that the vote in two predominantly Mexican-
American precincts was evenly divided on the rezoning issue. Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Org. v. Union City, No. 51590, at 2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1970).
89 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
376 (1967).
In Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y.
1970), the court, relying on Reitman and Hunter, explicitly acknowledged its "duty" to
consider not only the immediate objective but also the historical context and ultimate
effect of the action, and to assess the reality of the law's impact.
90 The availability of alternatives may be important in other contexts as well. For
example, in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y.
1970), defendant city placed a moratorium on subdivision construction on the ground of
overloaded sewers, thus blocking a proposed low-income housing project for blacks. The
court found that the reasons given for the moratorium were mere rationalizations since
the city failed to consider alternatives, such as methods of improving the sewer system,
and since the moratorium could not in fact solve the sewer problem. Id. at -.
91 293 F. Supp. at 305. In contrast,- the availability of alternative sites led the
district court in SASSO to conclude, on remand, that the effect of the referendum was
not discriminatory. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, No. 51590,
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In view of the historical and social setting, the courts must determine
whether the measure's ultimate impact will be to perpetuate residential
segregation.92 Further, the opinions in Reitman and the post-Reitman
cases have treated the authorization and encouragement of discrimina-
tion as independent grounds of violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment.98 Thus, even if the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the
inevitable perpetuation of discrimination, it may be sufficient to prove
authorization or encouragement and hence to establish a violation of
equal protection.
B. Judicial Remedies
Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use planning are
to be enjoyed by a city and the quality of life of its residents is
accordingly to be improved, the poor cannot be excluded from
enjoyment of the benefits. Given the recognized importance of
equal opportunities in housing, it may well be, as a matter of law,
that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning officials to see
that the city's plan ... accommodates the needs of its low-income
families, who usually-if not always-are members of minority
groups.94
The SASSO court thus sketched the possible future dimensions of
state responsibility regarding equal access to housing. This view imposes
on the community the affirmative duty of providing housing oppor-
tunities for disadvantaged groups in its plan, and on the courts the duty
of reviewing such plans. The propriety of judicial intervention in the
at 20 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1970). The court noted that 100 acres of vacant land currently
zoned for multi-family use, and another "100 or so" acres that could be rezoned for
multi-family use, would be suitable for low-income housing development. Id. at 5-7. The
court impliedly rejected SASSO's claim that the vacant areas presented terrain, conl-
ptruction, or parcel assembly problems or were otherwise unavailable for development.
Id. at 8.
92 The denial of rezoning to SASSO plaintiffs on remand may have been influenced
by the minimal effect of the proposed project on the dty's poor. Although the project
was to include 280 units, only 56 of those units were to be available for low-income
families. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, No. 51590, at 18 n.6
(N.D. Cal. July 30, 1970).
93 The California court's determination, in Reitman, that the ultimate impact of the
provision repealing the state's fair housing legislation would be to encourage, and
significantly involve the state in, private racial discrimination, was upheld by the Supreme
Court. 887 U.S. at 376; accord, Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968);
Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (ED. Wis. 1968). See generally Seeley, The
Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey,
55 CoRmi- L. REv. 881 (1970).
94 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th
Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
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zoning area has broad ramifications; 95 however, the cases herein con-
sidered do not require so broad a rationale. In Dailey, for example,
plaintiffs challenged the actions of the planning commission and city
council in denying the building permit and zoning change that would
have allowed construction of a low-income housing project;9 6 they did
95 If plaintiffs are planning no particular housing project, or if the project is so
large that it covers a vast area, they may seek to challenge the entire city plan rather
than the zoning classification of one relatively small site. In the former situation, the
problem of standing may be presented.
In both cases, the courts may lack the expertise to engage in large-scale planning.
This problem is not, however, insurmountable. Although a detailed examination of the
issues cannot be undertaken here, some possible approaches can be indicated. An analogy
can be made to the reapportionment and school desegregation cases where responsibility
for devising a workable plan was given back to those bodies (legislatures, school boards)
that had primary authority, but subject to the court's approval. See, e.g., Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (court review of school board's freedom-of-choice plan).
So in zoning, the planning commission or city council could be directed to make a new
plan, in accordance with equal protection requirements, subject to the court's approval.
Enforcement is another problem. Again, there is an analogy to education. The force
behind desegregation orders stems mainly from the HEW threat of a cut-off of federal
funds. An urban renewal panel has recently suggested that federal aid be withheld from
communities that resist low-cost housing. Dietsch, supra note 2. Thus, enforcement of
zoning orders could also be patterned after enforcement of school desegregation decrees.
Civil contempt might also be available for coercion of public officials who refuse to
comply with judicial decrees to produce satisfactory plans. See generally Dobbs, Contempt
of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNmL L. RItv. 183 (1970).
Although the district court in SASSO, on remand, heeded the Ninth Circuit's de-
lineation of state responsibility for equal housing opportunities for the poor, it did not
find it necessary to undertake a review of the entire city plan. Instead, the court ordered
that "the City take steps necessary and reasonably feasible under the law to accommodate
within a reasonable time the needs of low income residents of Union City." Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, No. 51590, at 21 (N.D. Cal. July 80, 1970).
The court required that such steps include the encouragement of privately sponsored
low-income housing programs, as well as the development of public housing programs
(which the city had previously declined to undertake (id. at 19)) requiring the exercise of
the city's fiscal and eminent domain powers "if such be necessary and reasonably feasible
... ." Id. at 21-22. The court set a tentative deadline for accommodation at May 1,
1971, and required that the city report its progress to the court within three months
after the decision and, after the first report, regularly at each three-month period. Id. at
22.
Although this approach apparently avoids the difficulties implicit in judicial review
of zoning, it raises additional, perhaps more serious, problems. First, the requirement that
the city undertake the construction of low-cost housing presupposes a constitutional
right to such housing. Despite a tendency to provide increasing governmental protection
for the housing interests of disadvantaged groups (see notes 34-43 and accompanying text
supra), however, the courts have not yet gone so far as to proclaim the existence of a
constitutional right to decent housing (see note 106 infra). Second, federal public housing
legislation explicitly requires the local governing body to determine the need for public
housing. See note 122 infra. Finally, judicial determination of the need for public housing
may well subject the courts to the same criticisms concerning lack of expertise and
involvement in political questions that are presented by judicial review of zoning plans.
96 425 F.2d at 1038.
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not challenge the entire city plan. Where the zoning classification of a
relatively restricted area is in issue, the courts need only adjudicate
the discriminatory effect of that classification. 97 It could be argued that
the court is still improperly engaged in zoning, even if on a smaller
scale than that envisioned in SASSO. But to deny courts the authority
to review zoning classifications is to deny relief to those discriminated
against; moreover, the courts have long performed such a "zoning"
function in nuisance cases. 98
In the referendum context, the courts need not engage in even
such limited "zoning." The typical situation is that in Ranjel, where
the electorate is attempting to repeal a zoning change, already approved
by the city, which would permit construction of a housing project. In
these cases, the local planning commission and city council have pre-
sumably considered the social and environmental land-use values; in
Ranjel, action was taken only after extensive investigation and a public
hearing.9 9 Thus, if the court invalidates the referendum repeal and the
city's classification is reinstated,10 0 the court's lack of expertise presents
no problem because the determination was originally made by a com-
petent administrative body.10 1
The cases under consideration have arisen in situations where a
97 Although it may be necessary for the courts to examine the character of the
neighborhood where the site in question is located, such an inquiry is still far more
restricted than a review of the entire city plan. Moreover, the courts have engaged in
such examinations as a matter of course in nuisance cases. See Beuscher & Morrison,
Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. Ray. 440, 441-42. There
are further similarities between nuisance cases and exclusionary zoning cases: both
normally involve multiple plaintiffs, and injunctive relief is most often sought. Id. See
also Roberts, From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use Planner: Eulogy for the
Lawyer as Social Engineer, 53 Conn.m L. Rav. 957 (1968).
98 "The cases ... reveal ... judges examining the use character of a neighborhood
in much the manner of a zoning board when preparing a zoning ordinance or amend-
ment." Beuscher & Morrison, supra note 97, at 441-42.
99 293 F. Supp. at 804.
100 Under some statutory provisions, a court has the authority to reverse, affirm, or
modify the determination of the zoning body. See, e.g., Landau Advertising Co. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957). Under other provisions, the court
may only quash the decision. See, e.g., Newport Poster Advertising Co. v. City Council, 84
R.I. 155, 122 A.2d 170 (1956).
101 Still another difficulty is whether it is proper to enjoin the referendum, or
whether it is necessary to wait until after the referendum to review the provision.
Although courts will not generally enjoin a referendum, some courts have done so if
irreparable harm to the plaintiff may otherwise result. See, e.g., Holmes v. Leadbetter,
294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.
Wis. 1968). See generally Note, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California,
54 CsAGr. L. REv. 1717, 1724-34 (1966). Some student commentators have been critical of
this approach. See Note, Referendums and Judicial Intervention, 80 Omo ST. L.J. 189
(1969); 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1617 (1969). For a discussion of the propriety of injunctive
relief in cases not involving referenda, see notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
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particular housing project has been blocked. The most suitable remedy,
therefore, is to enjoin defendants from prohibiting the construction of
the project on the ground of a zoning violation. First, compensatory
damages may well be unavailable.10 2 Even if money damages could be
granted, such a remedy would not afford adequate relief to those in-
jured by the discrimination. Plaintiffs would still be unable to reside
in more desirable communities; moreover, money damages would
provide insufficient compensation for the social and psychological det-
riments suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence of exclusion.103 There-
fore, injunctive relief, which has been a traditional remedy in similar
equal protection cases,104 is a "necessary and appropriate" remedy in
exclusionary zoning cases. 105
III
PUBLIC HOUSING
As has been discussed, the concept of equal housing opportunities
can signify the right not to be excluded from desirable residential com-
munities; it can also denote a constitutional right- to decent housing. 06
102 The courts have held that a governmental body is not liable in damages. Sires v.
Cole, 820 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 865 US. 167, 187-92 (1961).
Although a plaintiff may sue the individual official involved, certain officials have been
held immune from suit in similar situations, and some may lack the ability to pay
substantial damages. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 1185-36.
Furthermore, where damages are too speculative, compensatory relief will not be
granted. Id.; Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAav. L. REv. 994, 1002-04
(1965). By analogy to nuisance cases, plaintiffs may seek to recover as damages the value
of the use or enjoyment of the land of which they have been deprived. Baltimore &
P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1888); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW
OF TORTS § 91, at 628-24 (8d ed. 1964). In addition, however, plaintiffs may wish to
claim damages for such intangibles as the psychological harm of exclusion, the denial of
educational opportunities, and the inconvenience of having to travel long distances to
obtain suitable employment. The difficulty of assessing the value of such claims may well
lead the courts to conclude that they are too speculative to be compensable.
103 See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
104 E.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 896 U.S. 320, 886-37 (1970) (jury exclusion); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (reapportionment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
800 (1955) (education). The injunction is also a traditional remedy in nuisance cases.
See Beusher & Morrison, supra note 97, at 453-55. In some nuisance cases, the courts
have enjoined uses permitted by the zoning laws. E.g., Sweet v. Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146,
25 N.E.2d 968 (1940).
105 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 1970). The district court
had enjoined defendants from denying the building permit on the ground of a zoning
violation. 296 F. Supp. at 269.
106 The SASSO court characterized plaintiffs' equal protection contentions this way:
"They assert that the effect of the referendum is to deny decent housing and an,
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Although the Supreme Court has never been confronted by this pre-
cise issue, a related question is presented in the context of public
housing by Valtierra v. Housing Authority.07
Article XXXIV of the California constitution requires approval
by a majority of voters before any low-rent public housing can be
built.108 Other states have similar provisions. °09  In the two decades
since Article XXXIV was enacted, almost fifty percent of the low-
income housing units proposed were rejected by the voters." 0 In
Valtierra, plaintiffs, "persons of low income""' who were eligible for
public housing, challenged the constitutionality of Article XXXIV.
A three-judge district court held that the referendum requirement
violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights."2
integrated environment ... ." 424 F.2d at 295. See generally Micheman, The Advent of
a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RiGHTS-CiV. L1B. L. REv. 207
(1970); Note, Decent Housing as a Constitutional Right--42 U.S.C. § 1983-Poor People's
Remedy for Deprivation, 14 How. L.J. 338 (1968). See also Michelman, On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1968 Term,
83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. Cr.
REv. 199; Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 303 (1959).
107 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal.), prob. furls. noted sub nom. Shaffer v. Valtierra, 399
U.S. 925, and sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 398 U.S. 949 (1970).
108 CAL. CONsr. art. XXXIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or
acquired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the quali-
fied electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is
proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue,
approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that
purpose, or at any general or special election.
109 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.465(2) (1963); NEB. Rrv. STAT. § 71-1509 (Repl. 1966);
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-19.4 (Supp. 1968).
110 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1970, at 28, col. 5. Although 8% of the nation's poor reside
in California, that state has only 4% of the country's low-income housing; further,
California has only 1/3 the number of low-rent dwelling units per poor family as exist
in New York or Illinois. Id.
[The statistics on defeat of referenda tell] only a small part of the story. Many
housing authorities never even bother to have referenda put on the ballot
because they know they will be defeated. Referenda not only cost money ....
but also create political hazards for candidates who are expected to take a
position on such referenda.
Letter to the author from Myron Moskovitz, Chief Attorney, National Housing and
Development Law Project, Berkeley, California, Sept. 21, 1970 (on file, Cornell Law
Review).
11 CAL. CONsr. art. XXXIV, § 1, provides:
For the purposes of this article the term "low rent housing project" shall
mean any ... living accommodations for persons of low income ....
For the purposes of this article only "persons of low income" shall mean
persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary ...to
enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings, without overcrowding.
312 313 F. Supp. at 4-6.
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The Valtierra court relied heavily on Hunter v. Erickson.113
There, the Akron city charter prohibited the enactment of fair hous-
ing legislation without approval of a majority of voters. The Supreme
Court held that the provision distinguished between those seeking the
enactment of laws to protect against racial, religious, or ancestral dis-
criminations in real property transactions and those seeking regulations
in pursuit of other ends, unjustifiably making it substantially more
difficult to secure the former type of legislation than the latter. 14
The measure violated the equal protection clause by placing special
burdens on the access of minorities to the governmental process. 15
The Court was not deterred by the argument that the referendum
procedure was neutral:
Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and white,
Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's
impact falls on the minority. The majority needs no protection
against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bother-
some but no more than that." 6
Valtierra appears to fall squarely under the Hunter rule: the
classification distinguishes between those seeking to obtain federal
housing assistance for low-income groups and those seeking federal
assistance on behalf of other groups;" 7 and the reality is that the law's
impact falls on a minority group-the poor." 8
The classification in Hunter, however, was based on race. Although
non-white groups are disproportionately overrepresented among public
13 893 U.S. 885 (1969).
114 Id. at 389-91.
115 Id. at 392.
116 Id. at 391. This language has suggested to one commentator the possibility that
any referendum on minority group legislation violates equal protection: first, it is very
likely that voting in such referenda will be based on prejudice, and, since the voter is
responsible to no one, he can easily discriminate on the basis of race; then, either because
the state cannot promote a system that facilitates the operation of private racial dis-
crimination (Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)) or because equal treatment of
unequals does not provide equal protection (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 853 (1968);
Griffin v. llinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)), the referendum violates the fourteenth amend-
ment. Seeley, supra note 93, at 901-05.
A less sweeping response to the political impotence of the disadvantaged would be
to require a closer scrutiny of state actions having an adverse effect on such groups since
those actions stem from a "power structure" that is unresponsive to the needs of
minority groups and the poor. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Carlin, Howard &
Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, 1 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 9 (1966). Such a response could well supplement the disfavored-classification, funda-
mental-interest test. See notes 8-19 and accompanying text supra.
117 313 F. Supp. at 5.
11s Id. at 4-5.
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housing occupants," 9 the Valtierra classification is based on wealth, not
race. As has been shown, however, where the traditionally disfavored
wealth classification is combined with an interest of fundamental im-
portance, housing, the courts should apply the overriding justification
test. 2 0
At the very least, the state should be required to choose a less
onerous alternative, if one is available. 21 If the state interest is that
of local control, such control is already provided by the requirement of
local legislative approval of each housing project. 22 If the state interest
involved is that of voter control, such control could be granted by a
measure allowing referenda on public housing projects, in accordance
with the state's usual procedural provisions, rather than requiring
referendum approval before any public housing can be built.I23 The
119 Inside metropolitan areas, non-whites have a substandard occupancy four times
higher than that of whites (28% versus 7%); outside these areas, 77% of the non-whites
occupy substandard housing. THE REPORT oF THE PREsIDENT's COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING,
supra note 1, at 11. Thus, it is not surprising that non-whites occupy 50% of all public
housing units; they occupy an even larger percentage of non-elderly housing. THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 1, at 339. At least
in areas where the non-white occupancy of public housing is overwhelming (e.g., in
Chicago, the family housing tenants are 99% black; Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. MI1. 1969)), the courts should recognize that a
measure such as Article XXXIV denies equal protection to racial minorities as well as
to the poor, since "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Hunter v.
Erickson, 593 U.S. 385, 891 (1969).
120 See Section I supra.
121 See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 880 U.S. 89 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 879
U.S. 184 (1964). "Such a law . . will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." Id. at 196. See
also Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue
in Public Scfool Education, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1147, 1157-58 (1966).
122 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1964) provides for "local determination of the need for
public housing." Subsection 7(a) requires that the local governing body approve by
resolution the application of the public housing agency for a preliminary loan before
such a loan can be granted. Subsection 7(b) requires that the local governing body enter
into a cooperation agreement with the public housing agency before any contract can
be made with the Public Housing Administration for loans (other than preliminary
loans) or for annual contributions.
California law provides both for approval by resolution of the local governing body
and for consultation with the school district in which the project is to be located. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34313 (West 1967).
123 In Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. 2d 437, 94 P.2d 794 (1939), it was
held that public housing programs could not be subjected to referenda under the
applicable California statutory provisions. The appellant in Valtierra contends that Article
XXXIV was adopted "not to create a special procedure for housing but to bring housing
within the traditional controls." Brief for Appellant at 84, Shaffer v. Valtierra, Docket No.
226 (U.S., filed June 5, 1970). But Article XXXIV does not merely permit the submission
of housing programs to referenda, it requires such submission. The burden imposed is
heavier, because if a referendum were not required, its proponents might not be able
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former measure would provide for the state's interest without unduly
disadvantaging low-income persons; the latter unjustifiably imposes
upon such persons a special legislative burden in violation of their equal
protection rights.
Valtierra does not require the courts to assert the existence of a
constitutional right to decent housing; it therefore does not impose on
the states the affirmative duty to provide adequate housing for all
persons regardless of wealth. Valtierra merely requires that the states
not impose upon the poor any special legislative burdens in their efforts
to secure such housing through the political process.
CONCLUSION
The inadequate housing of minority groups and the poor can be
attributed both to the shortage of decent dwelling units and to the
lack of access to an integrated environment. The Fair Housing Act of
19681.24 has not been successful in opening up white suburbs and other
communities to minority groups.125 As yet no serious attempts have
been made to secure equal access to housing opportunities for the
poor.1 2 6 The equal protection clause provides an important vehicle
for alleviating these problems. The difficulty of obtaining decent hous-
ing units, through public housing and other government programs, will
be eased if the special burden of the referendum requirement is lifted.
Moreover, the opportunities to build low-income projects in non-
ghetto communities will be substantially increased if exclusionary
zoning tactics can be invalidated. The courts have given protection to
similar interests of similarly disadvantaged groups; 27 the same protec-
tion must be given to the housing interests of the poor.
Ellen S. George
to obtain the requisite number of petition signatures to warrant holding a referendum
for every proposed project. Moreover, the deterrent effect that the referendum require-
ment has on housing authorities (see note 110 supra) might be decreased.
124 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. V, 1970). This measure makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate in the sale, rental, or financing of housing.
125 Herbers, supra note 42.
126 Id.; Dietsch, supra note 2. An urban renewal panel has suggested that the
President now has authority to withhold federal funds from communities that resist low-
rent housing. HUD Secretary George Romney disagrees but has proposed a federal law
barring local governments from using exclusionary zoning and building codes. Id.
A new housing bill recently approved by the Senate provides for federal subsidies to
promote the development of "new cities," thereby alleviating the problem of urban
concentration. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 1, col. 2. Although the bill offers a partial
solution, it does nothing to open up existing neighborhoods to low-income families.
127 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
